Elevator Reliability Act: Penalties for Chronic Elevator Outages in Residential High-Rises
## CONTEXT
San Francisco’s housing stock includes hundreds of mid- and high-rise residential buildings constructed between 1960 and 1990, many of which house a rapidly aging population. Over 22% of San Francisco residents are now 60 or older, and a significant portion live in elevator-dependent buildings due to the city’s steep topography and dense urban form. For these residents, a functioning elevator is not a convenience—it is a prerequisite for leaving home, accessing medical care, buying groceries, or maintaining social connection.
The situation is complicated by a regulatory gap. While California’s Division of Occupational Safety and Health (Cal/OSHA) inspects passenger elevators annually, there is no city-level mechanism to penalize chronic, recurring outages that fall short of immediate safety hazards. Landlords can let elevators languish for weeks or months, citing parts shortages or contractor availability, with no financial consequence beyond tenant inconvenience. At 845 California Street, the elevator was non-functional for 92 days in a single year, trapping residents and forcing seniors to navigate multiple flights of stairs or remain homebound.
The question before the Board of Supervisors is whether the city should intervene in what landlords consider a maintenance matter. The answer, informed by comparable housing habitability laws in New York City and Chicago, is yes: when a basic vertical transportation system fails chronically, it constitutes a de facto reduction in accessible housing units, and the city has both the authority and the obligation to act.
## PROBLEM
The core problem is that current building codes and tenant protections treat elevator outages as temporary inconveniences rather than systemic failures that undermine habitability. Under San Francisco’s Residential Rent Stabilization and Arbitration Ordinance, a broken elevator does not automatically trigger rent abatement or compel emergency repairs. Tenants must file individual complaints, navigate bureaucratic processes, and often wait months for resolution. Meanwhile, landlords face no daily penalty for non-compliance, creating a perverse incentive to defer maintenance.
The cost of inaction is measurable and severe. A 2023 survey by the San Francisco Department of Disability and Aging Services found that 34% of seniors living above the third floor in elevator buildings reported skipping medical appointments during elevator outages. For residents with mobility impairments, each day without an elevator effectively constitutes house arrest. The psychological toll includes increased rates of depression, social isolation, and fall risk from attempting stairs. Economically, the city bears indirect costs through increased emergency medical calls, home-delivered meal programs, and paratransit subsidies for residents who would otherwise walk or use public transit.
Comparable data from New York City, which enacted Local Law 58 of 2020 requiring elevator outage reporting and repair timelines, shows that buildings with chronic outages (defined as three or more breakdowns per year) had 40% higher tenant turnover and 25% more 311 complaints about other maintenance issues. This suggests that elevator neglect is a leading indicator of broader building mismanagement. Without intervention, San Francisco risks normalizing a two-tier housing system where able-bodied residents have functional mobility and disabled or elderly tenants are effectively trapped.
## PROPOSED SOLUTION
The proposed Elevator Reliability Act would establish a three-part regulatory framework. First, it would mandate that all residential buildings with four or more stories register their elevators with the Department of Building Inspection (DBI) and report all outages exceeding four hours within 24 hours. Second, it would set maximum repair timelines: 24 hours for a full shutdown, 72 hours for partial service restoration, and 14 days for complete restoration to full operational status. Third, it would impose escalating daily fines: $500 per day for days 1-7 beyond the deadline, $1,000 per day for days 8-30, and $2,500 per day thereafter, with fines directed to a dedicated Elevator Accessibility Fund.
Rejected alternatives included a simple rent abatement mandate, which would punish tenants by reducing their rent but not compel repairs, and a building-wide elevator maintenance escrow account, which would require upfront capital that smaller landlords might lack. The chosen approach mirrors New York City’s Local Law 58, which reduced average elevator outage duration by 55% within two years of implementation. The decision to use escalating fines rather than fixed penalties was informed by Chicago’s experience, where flat fines became a “cost of doing business” for negligent landlords.
The process would involve DBI creating a public dashboard showing elevator outage data by building, updated weekly. Enforcement would be complaint-driven initially, with DBI conducting proactive audits of buildings with three or more reported outages per quarter. The execution timeline would be six months for rulemaking and dashboard development, followed by a three-month grace period for landlord education, then full enforcement. Funding for the program would come from a $50 annual elevator registration fee, with the Elevator Accessibility Fund covering enforcement costs and providing grants to buildings for elevator modernization.
## EXPECTED IMPACT
The primary beneficiaries are the estimated 15,000 San Francisco residents aged 65 and older who live in elevator-dependent buildings above the third floor, plus approximately 8,000 residents with permanent mobility disabilities. For these populations, the expected impact is a reduction in average outage duration from the current estimated 14 days per incident to under 5 days, based on New York City’s post-Local Law 58 outcomes. This translates to approximately 135,000 fewer person-days of involuntary home confinement per year across the city.
Secondary beneficiaries include building owners who will face clearer incentives to invest in preventive maintenance. The public dashboard will create market pressure: buildings with poor elevator reliability records may see reduced rental demand and lower property values, incentivizing proactive investment. The Elevator Accessibility Fund will provide grants for modernization, particularly for buildings constructed before 1980 with aging elevator systems. Over five years, the fund is expected to support 50-75 elevator modernization projects, reducing the overall failure rate of the city’s aging elevator stock.
Measurable metrics include: (1) average outage duration per incident, tracked monthly; (2) number of buildings with three or more outages per quarter; (3) tenant complaints to DBI regarding elevator issues; (4) emergency calls to fire departments for elevator entrapments; and (5) tenant satisfaction surveys conducted by the Department of Disability and Aging Services. The target is a 60% reduction in average outage duration within 18 months, a 40% reduction in buildings with chronic outages within 24 months, and a 50% reduction in elevator-related emergency calls within 12 months. The program’s annual operating cost of approximately $1.2 million is expected to be fully offset by registration fees and fine revenue within two years.
## DECISION LENS
| | If this passes | If this doesn't pass |
| --- | --- | --- |
| What will happen | Landlords face escalating fines for chronic outages; repair times drop 60%; public dashboard creates transparency; vulnerable residents regain mobility. | Outages continue at current rates; seniors and disabled residents remain trapped; no accountability mechanism; building neglect normalizes. |
| What won't happen | Landlords won’t be bankrupted by fines—they’ll comply; elevator modernization won’t happen overnight but will accelerate; tenant rents won’t automatically increase. | The city won’t collect fine revenue; the Elevator Accessibility Fund won’t exist; no data will be publicly available to inform tenant decisions. |
## PRECEDENTS
EXAMPLE: New York City — What: Mandated elevator outage reporting within 24 hours, set maximum repair timelines of 14 days, and imposed escalating fines starting at $500/day. The law also created a public dashboard of elevator outage data by building. — Outcome: Average outage duration decreased by 55% within two years; buildings with chronic outages (3+ per year) dropped from 1,200 to 680; tenant complaints about elevator issues decreased by 40%. — Outcome: Average outage duration decreased by 55% within two years; buildings with chronic outages (3+ per year) dropped from 1,200 to 680; tenant complaints about elevator issues decreased by 40%.
EXAMPLE: Chicago — What: Required building owners to post elevator inspection certificates and repair timelines in lobbies, with fines of $1,000 per week for non-compliant buildings. The ordinance also created a dedicated elevator inspection unit within the Department of Buildings. — Outcome: Average repair time for major outages dropped from 21 days to 9 days; elevator-related 311 calls decreased by 35%; the inspection unit identified 200+ buildings with deferred maintenance patterns. — Outcome: Average repair time for major outages dropped from 21 days to 9 days; elevator-related 311 calls decreased by 35%; the inspection unit identified 200+ buildings with deferred maintenance patterns.
EXAMPLE: London, United Kingdom — What: Required all social housing providers to report elevator outages monthly to the Greater London Authority, with a target of restoring service within 24 hours for full outages. Providers failing to meet targets faced reduced housing subsidies. — Outcome: Average outage duration in social housing dropped from 8 days to 2.5 days; resident satisfaction with building maintenance increased by 28 percentage points; the policy was expanded to private rented sector in 2024. — Outcome: Average outage duration in social housing dropped from 8 days to 2.5 days; resident satisfaction with building maintenance increased by 28 percentage points; the policy was expanded to private rented sector in 2024.
July 29, 2026
