Toronto
TransportationBuild the Spadina, East Metro, and Richvale Highways to Relieve Congestion
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What this proposes
Construct the three cancelled highways (Spadina, East Metro, Richvale) as a connected regional expressway network.
What your vote means
Support
Three cancelled highways are built as a connected regional expressway network.
Oppose
Existing neighborhoods and green space are preserved from demolition and bisection by new highways.
Arguments
For
- Completing the highway grid would cut commute times across the GTA.
- The $11 billion annual congestion cost justifies major road infrastructure investment.
- A connected expressway network would support projected population growth to 9 million by 2050.
Against
- New highways induce more driving, leading to the same congestion levels within a decade.
- Construction would demolish homes and bisect established neighborhoods.
- The $15+ billion cost would be better spent on expanding transit and rail.
Show full detail Background, problem, proposed solution, precedents
CONTEXT
The Greater Toronto Area (GTA) is one of the fastest-growing metropolitan regions in North America, with a population that has surged past 6.5 million and is projected to exceed 9 million by 2050. This growth has not been matched by proportional investment in road infrastructure. In the 1970s and 1980s, a series of planned expressways—the Spadina, East Metro, and Richvale—were cancelled following intense community opposition, particularly from neighborhoods that would have been bisected or demolished. The cancellation of the Spadina Expressway in 1971, famously championed by then-Premier Bill Davis with the declaration “Cities were built for people, not cars,” marked a turning point. The decision was celebrated at the time as a victory for livable, transit-oriented urbanism. However, the region’s subsequent development pattern—low-density suburban sprawl with limited highway connectivity—has created a structural mismatch. The GTA now routinely ranks among the world’s most congested urban areas, with TomTom and INRIX indices frequently placing Toronto at or near the top for commute times and delay per driver. The question is whether a decision made in a different era, for a much smaller city, remains valid for a global metropolis of today’s scale and complexity.
PROBLEM
The core problem is that the GTA’s transportation network is fundamentally underbuilt for its population and economic activity. The cancelled highways were intended to form a regional grid connecting suburbs to each other and to downtown, but their absence forces all traffic onto a few overloaded corridors: the Gardiner Expressway, the Don Valley Parkway, and arterial roads like Yonge Street and Steeles Avenue. The result is chronic, worsening congestion that imposes severe costs. According to the Toronto Region Board of Trade, congestion costs the regional economy an estimated $11 billion annually in lost productivity, delayed goods movement, and increased fuel consumption. The average GTA commuter loses over 100 hours per year stuck in traffic. This is not merely an inconvenience; it is a structural drag on economic competitiveness, making the region less attractive for business investment and talent retention. The cost of inaction is compounding. As population grows without new road capacity, congestion will worsen, pushing commute times past two hours for many suburban residents. This disproportionately harms lower-income workers who cannot afford to live near job centers and must rely on long car commutes. The original decision to cancel the highways prioritized the immediate quality of life of a minority of affected residents over the long-term mobility needs of millions. That tradeoff now needs re-examination.
PROPOSED SOLUTION
The proposal is to construct the three cancelled highways—Spadina, East Metro, and Richvale—as a connected regional expressway network. This is not a simple revival of 1970s-era plans; it requires modern design standards, including noise barriers, green corridors, and grade-separated intersections to minimize neighborhood impact. The Spadina Expressway would run from the existing Gardiner Expressway north to Highway 407, providing a western bypass of downtown. The East Metro Expressway would connect the Don Valley Parkway to Highway 401 and points east, relieving pressure on the Gardiner’s eastern segment. The Richvale Expressway would link Highway 400 and the 407 in the northwest, serving one of the fastest-growing suburban areas. Rejected alternatives include doing nothing (which guarantees worsening congestion), relying solely on transit expansion (which cannot serve the dispersed suburban trip patterns that dominate GTA travel), and implementing road pricing or tolls on existing roads (which would penalize current users without adding capacity). The implementation would follow a public-private partnership model, with the province and federal government sharing capital costs and toll revenues financing long-term maintenance. Environmental assessments and community consultations would be required, but the core decision—to build—must be made first. Comparable projects, such as the extension of Highway 407 or the construction of the 401 through Toronto, show that major highways can be built in dense urban areas with appropriate mitigation.
EXPECTED IMPACT
If built, the three highways would reduce average commute times across the GTA by an estimated 25-35%, based on traffic modeling of comparable highway completions in other major cities. The most significant benefits would accrue to suburban residents in Brampton, Vaughan, Markham, and Scarborough, who currently face the longest commutes. Goods movement would improve, with truck travel times on key corridors reduced by up to 40%, lowering costs for businesses and consumers. The economic benefit, measured in reduced delay and increased productivity, is estimated at $5-8 billion annually, providing a strong return on the estimated $15-20 billion construction cost. However, there are negative impacts. The highways would require the acquisition and demolition of an estimated 2,000-3,000 homes and businesses, primarily in lower-income and immigrant neighborhoods along the planned routes. Air quality near the highways would worsen, with increased particulate matter and nitrogen oxide emissions affecting nearby residents. The induced demand effect—where new capacity generates additional traffic—would partially offset congestion relief over time, though studies suggest that in severely constrained networks, new highways do provide lasting net benefits. The net impact is a classic tradeoff: significant regional economic and mobility gains, concentrated in the suburbs, at the cost of localized disruption and environmental harm in the urban core.
DECISION LENS
| If this passes | If this doesn’t pass | |
|---|---|---|
| What will happen | Three highways are built; commute times drop 25-35%; 2,000-3,000 homes are demolished; air quality worsens along routes; economic productivity rises $5-8B/year | Congestion continues to worsen; commute times increase; economic costs of delay grow; no homes are demolished; no new displacement occurs |
| What won’t happen | Transit-only solutions won’t be pursued as primary strategy; induced demand won’t be fully avoided; neighborhoods along routes won’t be preserved | The highways won’t be built; congestion won’t be relieved; suburban commuters won’t see improvement; the structural mismatch between population and road capacity persists |
PRECEDENTS
EXAMPLE: Los Angeles, CA — What: Completion of the 105 Freeway (Century Freeway) in the 1990s, a major urban highway through dense, low-income neighborhoods, built with extensive community mitigation including replacement housing and sound walls. — Outcome: Reduced congestion on parallel arterials by 30-40%, but induced demand filled the highway within a decade; the mitigation program built 7,000+ replacement housing units, partially offsetting displacement. — Outcome: Reduced congestion on parallel arterials by 30-40%, but induced demand filled the highway within a decade; the mitigation program built 7,000+ replacement housing units, partially offsetting displacement. EXAMPLE: Houston, TX — What: The Katy Freeway (I-10) expansion, which added four tolled managed lanes to an existing urban highway, creating one of the widest freeways in the world. — Outcome: Peak-period travel times dropped by 30% initially, but congestion returned to pre-expansion levels within 5 years due to induced demand; the managed lanes maintained reliable speeds for toll-paying users. — Outcome: Peak-period travel times dropped by 30% initially, but congestion returned to pre-expansion levels within 5 years due to induced demand; the managed lanes maintained reliable speeds for toll-paying users. EXAMPLE: Seoul, South Korea — What: The Cheonggyecheon restoration project, which removed an elevated highway and restored a stream, reducing traffic capacity in the corridor. — Outcome: Traffic dispersed to other routes, with overall congestion increasing only marginally; property values along the restored stream rose 30-50%; the project demonstrated that highway removal can succeed in dense urban settings with strong transit alternatives. — Outcome: Traffic dispersed to other routes, with overall congestion increasing only marginally; property values along the restored stream rose 30-50%; the project demonstrated that highway removal can succeed in dense urban settings with strong transit alternatives.
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Discussion
Building these highways will just induce more demand and fill them up immediately, as every traffic study predicts. The $11 billion congestion cost is real, but adding lane miles in a dispersed region has never solved congestion long-term — it just shifts the bottleneck.
This is a genuine re-examination of tradeoffs from the 1970s, but we need to be honest about who pays. The original cancellations protected mostly white, middle-class neighborhoods from demolition, while today's congestion hits lower-income suburban commuters hardest.
We've been here before. LA and Houston built massive highway networks and still top congestion charts — capacity alone doesn't solve the problem. What did work was London's congestion charge and Stockholm's cordon pricing, which reduced traffic without new asphalt.
Does the math actually work? A P3 toll model means drivers pay for decades, and if induced demand fills the roads, toll revenues won't cover the bonds. We need a hard cap on total vehicle kilometers, not just new pavement.
This unlocks a genuine regional grid that connects suburbs to each other, not just to downtown. Done right with green corridors and noise barriers, it could shift thousands of trucks off local streets and actually improve air quality in the neighborhoods they currently cut through.
The tension is real: the old plan protected neighborhoods but stranded suburban commuters, while this plan risks repeating past mistakes. A credible middle path would pair highway construction with a binding commitment to parallel transit investment, not just token bus lanes.