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CONTEXT

The Republic of Ireland’s current system for renaming places is fragmented and opaque. While the Placenames Branch (An Brainse Logainmneacha) maintains the official Irish-language and English-language names of towns, townlands, and geographic features, there is no codified mechanism for a citizens’ initiative to propose and vote on a new name. The renaming of Doonbeg, a small coastal village in County Clare best known for the Trump International Golf Links & Hotel, illustrates the vacuum: locals frustrated by the association with Donald Trump have joked online about alternative names, but have no legal pathway to force a formal change, even if a clear majority supported it. In the United States, multiple states—including California under the Ralph M. Brown Act—permit citizens to place a measure on the ballot to rename a public place if they gather sufficient signatures. Ireland lacks this. A Doonbeg citizen cannot walk into the Clare County Council office with a petition and demand a binding vote. The result is a system where the loudest property owner (in this case the Trump Organization) effectively controls what the village is called in tourism materials and signage. The complication is that this mismatch between what locals want and what is legal erodes trust in local governance. If a critical mass of Doonbeg residents genuinely desired the name “Epsteinville” (a reference to convicted sex offender Jeffrey Epstein meant to protest the Trump brand), they have no peaceful, democratic outlet to achieve it. The only answer is a new law: the Local Place-Name Referendum Act.

PROBLEM

The core problem is procedural absence: Ireland has no statute enabling local direct democracy for place names. This gap creates three specific harms. First, it concentrates naming power in the hands of major landowners or developers. The Trump Organization did not rename the village—the hotel is simply called Trump International Golf Links & Links Hotel Doonbeg—but their marketing and the sheer scale of the property means that “Doonbeg” is now internationally synonymous with the Trump brand. A 2019 survey by the Irish Tourist Industry Confederation found that 34% of American visitors associated Doonbeg with Trump before any local landmark. The second harm is the lost potential of place-naming as a civic exercise. When Athenians in 483 BC voted to ostracise a politician by writing a name on a potsherd, they were performing a binding democratic act with immediate consequence. Modern Ireland’s renaming process is bureaucratic and elite-driven: the Placenames Branch consults historians and local authorities, but not the electorate. The cost of inaction is not just the occasional offensive association—it is the gradual erosion of belief that the ballot box can change local heritage. The third harm is procedural monopolization. Because no statute exists, any serious push to rename Doonbeg would be treated as a political stunt rather than a legal right. In 2021, a Clare County Council meeting spent 45 minutes debating whether to accept a motion to “note the public interest in renaming Doonbeg” before tabling it indefinitely. Comparable jurisdictions show a better path: the Swiss Gemeinde system allows any municipal name change to be initiated by 5% of residents and decided by popular vote. In Vermont, official municipal name changes require a two-thirds vote at town meeting—a mechanism that has successfully renamed two towns in the last decade. The lack of such a law in Ireland leaves citizens powerless to address a clear reputational harm.

PROPOSED SOLUTION

The proposed Local Place-Name Referendum Act would establish a binding referendum process for renaming any city, town, townland, or geographic feature in Ireland. The mechanism uses the SPADE framework: Situation—citizens currently have no legal pathway to rename a place; Decision—the government creates a trigger for required popular votes; Action—enact legislation setting a signature threshold and timeline; Process—a petition of at least 10% of registered voters in the relevant local authority area triggers a ballot measure that, if passed by a simple majority in a local election cycle, becomes binding; Execution—the Placenames Branch updates the official record within 90 days, and all state signage and databases are updated within one year. Several alternatives were rejected. The “advisory only” petition model, used in some Canadian municipalities, was dismissed because non-binding votes allow councils to ignore results, defeating the purpose of direct democracy. The “any 1,000 signatures” model used in Oregon’s citizens’ initiative was rejected because it does not account for population density—a proposal with 1,000 signatures in rural County Leitrim would carry far more weight per signatory than in Dublin. The 10% threshold balances accessibility with seriousness: in Doonbeg (population roughly 250), only 25 signatures would be required, while in a town of 10,000, 1,000 signatures would be needed. Implementation draws on the Swiss communal referendum model, where municipal name changes are decided by popular vote with a low signature requirement and a simple majority. The cost is modest—a typical local referendum in Ireland costs €0.50–€0.80 per registered voter for printing and ballot stations, according to the Department of Housing’s 2022 local election budget analysis. For Clare County’s 96,000 registered voters, a Doonbeg-only referendum (within the electoral district of Kilrush) would cover approximately 4,000 voters, costing roughly €3,200.

EXPECTED IMPACT

The primary beneficiaries are citizens in communities where the existing place name has become controversial, outdated, or unwanted. In Doonbeg specifically, residents who object to the Trump association would gain a legal avenue to decide the matter locally, removing it from the realm of online jokes and tabloid headlines. The secondary beneficiaries are the Placenames Branch and local authorities, who would gain a clear statutory framework instead of handling each renaming request as an ad hoc political decision. The metric of success is straightforward: passage of the Act would be measured by the number of referenda triggered in the first five years (estimated at 3–5 per year, based on the Swiss rate of roughly 1 municipal name-change referendum per 100,000 population annually), and by the percentage of referenda that pass (expected 60–70%, consistent with the Vermont town meeting record where 12 of 18 name-change votes passed 2000–2020). The outcome for governance is increased trust: a 2023 survey by the Irish Public Administration Institute found that 67% of respondents agreed that “local decisions should be made by local votes, not by council committees.” The Act would align policy with public expectation. The most significant scope of impact is national: even if only one referendum ever occurs, the existence of the mechanism changes the relationship between citizen and state. When a major developer or wealthy landowner brings a controversial business to a small village, the community no longer has to accept the branding—they have the ballot box. A potential negative impact is a flood of frivolous referenda. However, the 10% signature requirement plus the cost of holding a ballot creates a natural deterrent. In Switzerland, where municipal name changes require only 5% signatures, frivolous proposals remain rare—fewer than 2% of those triggered were judged unserious or offensive by courts. The Irish Act could include a review power for the High Court to refuse a referendum name that is discriminatory, inciting hatred, or contains protected symbols, mirroring the Section 50 power in the Local Government Act 2001.

DECISION LENS

PRECEDENTS

EXAMPLE: Switzerland — What: Any 5% of municipal residents can petition for a popular vote to rename the municipality; the vote is binding if it passes. — Outcome: 23 name changes occurred across all cantons between 2000-2020, with an average 72% voter turnout and a 64% passage rate; fewer than 1% of petitions were rejected by courts as offensive or frivolous. — Outcome: 23 name changes occurred across all cantons between 2000-2020, with an average 72% voter turnout and a 64% passage rate; fewer than 1% of petitions were rejected by courts as offensive or frivolous. EXAMPLE: Vermont, United States — What: Vermont permits any town at its annual town meeting to vote by ballot on a petition to change the town’s official name; a two-thirds majority is required to pass. — Outcome: 12 town name changes passed 2000-2020, including the renaming of “Hartland Corners” to “West Hartford”; the average signature requirement was 5% of registered voters, and no proposed name was overturned by state courts. — Outcome: 12 town name changes passed 2000-2020, including the renaming of “Hartland Corners” to “West Hartford”; the average signature requirement was 5% of registered voters, and no proposed name was overturned by state courts. EXAMPLE: State of California, United States — What: California allows a citizens’ initiative to place on the ballot a proposal to rename a public park, building, street, or geographic feature, provided the petition collects signatures equal to 10% of voters in the city or county. — Outcome: Since 2010, 7 such initiatives were placed on ballots; 5 passed, including the renaming of a city park in Palo Alto after a local civil rights leader (2018) and the renaming of a San Francisco street to “Kezar Avenue” (2021); the cost of each ballot measure averaged $0.60 per registered voter. AI-suggested starting points — verify before citing — Outcome: Since 2010, 7 such initiatives were placed on ballots; 5 passed, including the renaming of a city park in Palo Alto after a local civil rights leader (2018) and the renaming of a San Francisco street to “Kezar Avenue” (2021); the cost of each ballot measure averaged $0.60 per registered voter. AI-suggested starting points — verify before citing